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Abstract 
Recent years have seen a surge of attention to the problem of 
logical pluralism; most of which has been a reaction to Beall and 
Restall’s account of logical pluralism as the existence of more 
than one equally correct semantic relation of logical consequence. 
The underlying thesis is that the indeterminacy of the notion of 
validity goes beyond what the inductive-deductive distinction can 
precisify. The notion of deductive validity itself is indeterminate 
as well and this indeterminacy has its roots in the indeterminacy 
of the more fundamental notion of case. Cases are what make the 
premisses and the conclusion of an argument true; the most 
notable example being Tarskian models for classical logic. 
Deductive validity is the preservation of truth across all cases. This 
paper argues that unless this account of logical pluralism is 
supplemented with an argument in favor of the equal legitimacy 
of the purported cases it becomes merely a semi-controversial 
exposition of how different logics can be generated. 
Keywords: Logical Pluralism, Logical Consequence, Validity, 
Case 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of classical logic, various challenges have 
been brought up against it; both from those who see it as a 
correct yet inadequate enterprise and those who consider it to be 
incorrect in the first place. The original intent of the creators of 
classical logic was the analysis of mathematical arguments. 
Mathematicians practice some kind of reasoning while doing 
mathematics and classical logic is supposed to be a description of 
that practice. Given the necessary and timeless nature of 
mathematical truths, classical logic does not incorporate modality 
and temporality. Also, given its narrow scope and exclusion of 
non-mathematical arguments, classical logic does not possess the 
power to analyze non-mathematical arguments either, or even 
worse, it may not be fit to analyze mathematical arguments in the 
first place1. 
These criticisms have acted as an incentive for logicians to 
come up with a plethora of logical systems. It is natural for rivalry 
to arise in such a context. Is classical logic the one and only 
correct logic? Or should another logical system take its place? Is 
there even a constraint to adopt only one correct logic or is it 
possible for more than one logic to be true? The intuitive 
response to the last question seems to be that there could only 
ever be one correct logic. But intuition may not always be the best 
judge. Beall and Restall (2000) and subsequently Beall and Restall 
(2001, 2006) argued for a version of logical pluralism that relies 
on a semantic or model-theoretic interpretation of logical 
                                                     
1 For more detail see Burgess (2009). 
consequence2. According to this interpretation, an argument is 
valid if and only if there is no case in which the premisses are true 
and the conclusion false. The core of Beall and Restall’s argument 
is that ‘case’ refers to an indeterminate concept; and depending 
on how a case is specified, there can be different validities or 
logical consequences. So for instance, if cases are complete, 
consistent, and have a non-empty domain then the logical 
consequence will be classical. In section 2 of this article we 
discuss their formulation of logical pluralism in detail. 
Since its publication, Beall and Restall’s proposal has 
come under attack from various perspectives. There are a family 
of objections which Caret (2017) calls the collapse problem. These 
objections maintain that Beall and Restall’s thesis ultimately 
collapses into a form of logical monism (Keefe, 2014; Priest, 
2001, 2006; Read 2006). There is also the problem of the truth-
conditions of logical connectives and meaning variance; which 
deals with the problem of how the meaning of logical connectives 
stays the same across different logics while that of logical 
consequence changes. The list goes on (Beall & Restall, 2000, 
2001). However, one area of weakness that we believe has been 
neglected, even though alluded to at some point, is the equal 
legitimacy of these purported cases. We argue that the ultimate 
explanation of legitimacy for cases is metaphysical. 
                                                     
2 Later Restall (2014) argues for a proof theoretical reading of model theory; 
hence, making a proof theoretical case for logical pluralism using certain 
limitations on Gentzen’s sequent calculus. 
Beall and Restall’s approach to the legitimacy of cases, 
roughly speaking, is their presumption of innocence or in this 
instance the presumption of legitimacy; i.e. cases are legitimate 
unless proven otherwise. As long as a logic can explain what its 
cases are and how they make sentences true it’s free to roam. This, 
however, doesn’t seem to line up with the history of the conflict 
between certain logics. Intuitionistic logic, for instance, was born 
out of the anti-realist conviction that mathematical objects are 
mental constructions. On Beall and Restall’s account, intuitionists 
are employing constructive reasoning, as opposed to classical 
reasoning, for mathematical objects. What they fail to 
acknowledge is that intuitionistic logic takes constructive 
reasoning to be the only valid form of reasoning; i.e. 
constructions are the only legitimate instances of case. There is no 
legitimacy for classical cases from an intuitionistic perspective. It 
takes a bit more than what Beall and Restall offer to convince the 
intuitionist to take classical logic to be as correct as intuitionistic 
logic. There seems to be a need to argue for the equal legitimacy 
of cases if one intends to defend Beall and Restall’s thesis. Later, 
we will lay out this problem in more detail. 
2. Logical Pluralism 
Logical pluralism has had its own proponents prior to Beall and 
Restall (2000). The most notable one is perhaps Carnap (1937); 
who defends a form of logical pluralism via linguistic pluralism or 
the principle of tolerance. Beall and Restall’s account, however, is what 
Priest calls ‘the most sustained defense of [logical] pluralism’ 
(Priest, 2006, p. 200). The significance of their account may be 
due to the fact that it tries to remain loyal to our basic intuitions 
regarding meta/logical concepts, yet make a case for pluralism. 
These basic intuitions involve two theses: The meaning invariance 
of logical constants and the common concept of logical 
consequence. 
According to the meaning invariance thesis, the meaning 
of logical constants across different systems does not change. 
There is only one negation, conjunction, disjunction, etc. Carnap’s 
pluralism negates the meaning invariance thesis. Corresponding 
logical constants in different logics, on his account, are merely 
homonymous. The disjunction in classical logic and intuitionistic 
logic merely look alike and sound alike but they have different 
meanings. This is a fairly important issue in the literature on 
pluralism. The implication of this for logical pluralism is that 
when different logics disagree they are in fact merely talking past 
each other and there is no substantial disagreement in play. When 
discussing the disagreement between consistent and 
paraconsistent logics regarding the principle of explosion Quine 
writes, 
My view of this dialogue is that neither party 
knows what he is talking about. They think they 
are talking about negation, ‘~’, ‘not’; but surely the 
notation seized to be recognizable as negation 
when they took to regarding some conjunctions of 
the form ‘p. ~p’ as true, and stopped regarding 
such sentences as implying all others. Here, 
evidently, is the deviant logician’s predicament: 
when he tries to deny the doctrine he only 
changes the subject (Quine, 1970, p. 81). 
On this view, there is no one single argument that is being 
disagreed upon. The opposing parties are talking past each other; 
they are talking about two different arguments. There is a classical 
conjunction and there is a paraconsistent conjunction; even 
though their homonymy gives rise to the illusion that they are 
talking about the same argument. 
What Beall and Restall claim to have accomplished is that 
the meaning invariance thesis stands. The intuitionistic, 
relevantistic, and classical logician all talk about the same 
conjunction, negation, disjunction, etc. The hypothetical 
argument in question which is being disagreed upon by all parties 
is one and the same. Nevertheless, they disagree upon its validity. 
With regards to negation they write, 
~A is true in x iff A is not true in x. Call this the 
classical negation clause. There are many good 
reasons for using a classical negation clause in 
constructing an account of truth in cases. The most 
obvious reason is the way we use negation, and 
the conditions under which negations are, in fact, 
true: ~A is true just when A is not true. This, one 
might say, is simply what ‘not’ means (B&R, 2000, 
p. 481).  
The meaning of logical constants stays the same. The 
variable that generates different validities are cases. This seems to 
be congruent with our observation of the disagreement between 
different logics. There is a substantial disagreement and not what 
Quine calls a ‘change of subject’. To what degree have they 
managed to establish this thesis falls beyond the scope of this 
article. For the sake of argument, let’s assume they’ve successfully 
managed to establish the meaning invariance thesis. At the very 
least, it’s what they claim to have done while still being able to 
preserve some form of pluralism; and that’s what makes their 
formulation controversial and worth the attention it has gotten so 
far3. 
The second intuition is what Tarski calls the common 
concept of logical consequence (Tarski, 1983, p. 409). Tarski 
claims that our informal understanding of the notion of logical 
consequence plays a crucial role in its formal characterization. His 
characterization is what has come to be known as the model-
theoretic understanding of logical consequence. This notion is 
characterized by the lack of any counterexamples. For any set  
of premisses and  a conclusion,  ⊨  ( is a logical 
consequence of ) if and only if it’s not possible for  to be true 
(every sentence in  to be true)  and  false.  
Moreover, according to Tarski’s account of logical 
consequence, there are also three more integral features that a 
                                                     
3 Restall (2002, 2014) reaffirm the meaning invariance thesis. 
relation needs to possess in order for it to be a relation of logical 
consequence: modality, formality, apriority4. The modal element 
is represented by the use of the term ‘possible’. Not only is it not 
the case that  is true and  false, but it’s impossible for  to be 
true and  false. Secondly, the logical consequence relation is a 
formal relation. It is the logical forms of the sentences of  and  
that determine whether the relation obtains or not. Thirdly, it’s a 
priori. Our knowledge of  ⊨  is a priori and cannot be affected 
by empirical knowledge. 
Beall and Restall base their formulation of logical 
pluralism on this understanding of logical consequence. They 
formulate the model-theoretic understanding with what they call 
the Generalized Tarski Thesis, 
(GTT)  ⊨  iff in any case in which  is true is also a case 
in which  is true. 
This thesis is meant to capture the Tarskian idea that 
there should not exist any counterexamples. As longs as a relation 
conforms to (GTT) and is necessary, formal, and a priori it can be 
called a relation of logical consequence. This is the core of the 
model-theoretic account of logical consequence. 
There is a peculiar aspect to (GTT) that makes it very 
interesting. Despite it being able to capture the core of the model-
                                                     
4 Beall and Restall (2000) and cook (2010) do not include the epistemic 
element. Later in Beall and Restall (2006) normativity is added as the epistemic 
element. McKeon (2010) takes apriority to be the epistemic element. 
theoretic notion, it contains an indeterminate concept; that of a 
case. Beall and Restall maintain that different logics specify cases 
differently; through which, different validities can be generated. 
There is no such thing as an absolute validity. Validity exists only 
relative to a specific logic. So to formulate (GTT) precisely, 
(GTTX)  ⊨x  iff in any casex in which  is true is also a 
casex in which  is true. 
The argument from  to  is validx if and only if  any casex 
in which  is true is also a casex in which  is true. So it seems 
their pluralism rests upon different specifications of cases. In their 
own words, 
A logic is given by a specification of the cases to 
appear in (V)5. Such a specification of cases can be 
seen as a way of spelling out truth conditions of 
the claims expressible in the language in question 
(B&R, 2000, p. 477). 
 To make all of this clearer let’s use Quine’s example of 
paraconsistency, 
(EFQ) For every , A  ~A ⊨  
The classical logician accepts (EFQ) while the 
paraconsistent logician rejects it. The Quinean analysis suggests 
                                                     
5 The (GTT) was named the (V) thesis in Beall and Restall (2000). Later in 
Beall and Restall (2006) they renamed it to (GTT); which is what it has come to 
be known as ever since. 
that there are actually two different (EFQ)s that the two parties 
are talking about, 
(EFQ)c For every , A c ~c A ⊨  
(EFQ)p For every , A p ~p A ⊨  
It is obvious that (EFQ)c and (EFQ)p do not represent one 
and the same argument. So unless the two parties determine what 
conjunction and negation really mean the problem remains. Once 
they succeed in doing so the problem is dissolved. 
On Beall and Restall’s analysis the conjunction and 
negation are the same in both arguments. It’s the validity that 
varies, 
(EFQ)*c For every , A  ~A ⊨c  
(EFQ)*p For every , A  ~A ⊨p  
And what makes these validities different is that the 
classical logician specifies cases as consistent, but the 
paraconsistent logician takes them to be inconsistent. (EFQ)*c 
says ‘For every , in any consistent case that A  ~A is true,  is 
true too.’; while (EFQ)*p says ‘For every , in any inconsistent case 
that A  ~A is true,  is true too.’ There is no further question 
about the absolute validity of (EFQ). Classical validity and 
paraconsistent validity have equal rights to be deemed a relation 
of logical consequence. 
In their seminal paper, Beall and Restall discuss four 
different cases: possible worlds, Tarskian models, situations, and 
constructions. Now, all four of these presumably have equal 
rights to act as cases, but not all of them retain the core features of 
the common concept of logical consequence. If cases are to be 
taken as possible worlds logical consequence will lose its 
formality. To cite their own example, the argument a is red ⊨ a is 
colored is valid if cases are possible worlds; for the very simple 
reason that in every possible world in which ‘a is red’ is true, ‘a is 
colored’ is true too. However, its validity does not hold in virtue 
of its logical form. The logical form of the argument is Ra ⊨ Ca6; 
which is not a valid form of argument. 
The other three, however, do leave the core features 
intact. Beall and Restall (2000) and subsequently Beall and Restall 
(2006) cover this issue extensively; Tarskian models for classical 
logic, situation semantics for relevantistic logic, and Kripke 
semantics for intuitionistic logic7. 
Situations are like bits or fragments of the world. Unlike 
Tarskian models, situations are incomplete. Thus, A ⊨ B  ~B 
fails. It is possible for A to be true in situation s and for B  ~B 
not to be true in situation s. Furthermore, situations can be 
inconsistent as well; i.e., (EFQ) fails. For the argument A  ~A 
⊨ B, it is possible for A  ~A to be true in situation s and for B 
not to be true in situation s. 
In intuitionistic logic, constructions are incomplete as 
well. The Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is meant to 
                                                     
6 Rx: ‘x is red’ and Cx: ‘x is colored’. 
7 A possible-world semantics for intuitionistic logic. For more details, see 
Kripke (1965). 
model these constructions to imitate truth-conditional semantics. 
Constructions are about provability. In the argument A ⊨ B  
~B, it is possible for A to be true in construction c (provable) and 
for B  ~B not to be true in construction c (not provable). Both 
relevantistic and intuitionistic logics are paracomplete; i.e. they are 
not complete in the sense explained above. 
To sum it up, there are two steps to successfully establish 
the kind of pluralism Beall and Restall are trying to defend, 
(1) Different equally legitimate logics can be generated by 
plugging different cases into (GTTX); provided the 
generated logical consequence relation retains the 
three core features of logical consequence: necessity, 
formality, apriority. 
(2) The cases that generate the equally legitimate logics in 
(1) are themselves equally legitimate. 
Beall and Restall argue for (1) in great detail. But (2) is not 
seriously addressed. It is alluded to in a sense when they’re trying 
to respond to critics who blame their formulation for dissolving 
the issue of real disagreement between different logic. They say, 
Perhaps a more telling illustration arises within 
our own pluralistic ranks, and in particular on the 
issue of dialetheism, according to which 
contradictions may be true. Dialetheists maintain 
that there are arguments of the form A  B, ~A  
⊨ B which are not only invalid but which have 
true premises and an untrue conclusion. Now, 
while both of us agree that the given argument is 
invalid-there are cases in which the premises are 
true and the conclusion untrue (viz., inconsistent 
situations)-we disagree with each other on the 
issue of whether the actual world is a case in which 
the premises are true. One of us (JC) endorses 
dialetheism; the other (Greg) does not. Still, 
despite this disagreement within our own ranks 
neither of us has transgressed our pluralist 
commitments. The point of disagreement is a 
genuine one; however, it is an issue on which 
pluralism is neutral (B&R, 2000, pp. 488-489). 
This paragraph is very interesting. It seems that Beall and 
Restall have no intention of defending (2) at all. Their pluralism is 
neutral with respect to it; i.e. it has nothing to offer with respect 
to the disagreement between dialetheists and non-dialetheists. But 
isn’t that what logical pluralism was supposed to accomplish in 
the first place? Moreover, they see this disagreement as a genuine 
disagreement about how the world is. What’s interesting about 
this is that their pluralism is not an argument for pluralism at all8. 
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logical monist! The one true logic is FDE (First-Degree Entailment); logics 
that are neither complete nor consistent. These different logics discussed in 
their pluralism are merely the result of applying certain restrictions to the one 
true logical consequence of FDE. 
It’s more of an exposition of the story behind different forms of 
validity rather than an argument for their equal status. Even 
though (1) is a necessary condition for defending pluralism, it is 
not sufficient. For pluralism to work (2) must be established as 
well; one has to demonstrate that the different cases that are being 
plugged into (GTTX) stand on equal ground. We will pick up on 
these issues later. Before delving deeper into the problem with 
Beall and Restall’s pluralism, it’s imperative that we go through 
the history of logic to see where the conflict between different 
logics actually lies. 
3. The real conflict 
To shed light on the historical conflict between rival logics, here 
we discuss two different logics: intuitionistic and Free logics. 
Mathematical intuitionism is the view that takes 
mathematics to be essentially about the mental constructions of 
the human mind. Intuitionists initially denigrated the role of 
language in mathematics to a mere medium through which 
mathematical constructions can be communicated. According to 
intuitionism, mathematics is primarily about mental activities 
performed by the human intellect. The epistemological terminus a 
quo of intuitionism is the notion of the move of time, which can be 
traced back to Kant’s notion of time as pure a priori intuition. 
The founder of intuitionism, Brouwer (1948), started off from 
this point and began his phenomenological analysis of the nature 
of natural numbers and how they are constructed, which is often 
referred to as the first act of intuitionism. Then he proceeded to 
develop the rest of mathematics based on this basic intuition. All 
mathematical objects are created by the human mind through the 
first act, which would make these objects totally mind-dependent; 
in other words, they are mental objects. So intuitionists reject the 
existence of abstract mathematical objects which are mind-
independent, non-spatiotemporal objects. Put differently, 
intuitionists are anti-realists in ontology. For Brouwer ‘a 
mathematical statement is true only when a corresponding 
construction has been made’ (Schlimm, 2005, p. 174).  
The phenomenological analysis Brouwer makes rests on 
the premise that the human mind is capable of perceiving the 
continuity of time introspectively. In perceiving a single moment 
of this continuity, the human mind can also perceive this single 
moment fall into two separate moments, with one succeeding the 
other. This is what he calls the two-onesness. These moments are 
distinct, but at the same time they’re continuous. This is how the 
mind constructs the numbers one and two. By repeating this 
process all natural numbers can be constructed. According to 
Brouwer, ‘intuition is the abstract form of any perception of 
change’ (Schlimm, 2005, p. 173). And this is how the intuition of 
time rips of every moment of its qualities and yields us the bare 
two-oneness or the pure form. This method constitutes the grounds 
for constructing the rest of mathematics, and that’s why the 
temporal intuition is referred to as the basal intuition of 
mathematics.  
There are a couple of points about Brouwer’s intuitionism 
that need to be emphasized. First, from Brouwer’s point of view, 
the construction process fully captures the essence of 
mathematics. Language is not an essential part of mathematics 
since it is not involved in this process at all. If it wasn’t for its 
intermediary role, mathematical language would’ve already been 
dispensed with. Thus no attempt was made to come up with a 
semantical theory. Second, Brouwer reduced existence to 
constructability. In other words, for a certain mathematical object 
to exist it only needs to be constructed.  
Even though for Brouwer language may not have been an 
essential part of mathematics, that doesn’t mean it is impossible 
for the intuitionist to somehow accommodate language. 
Inessentiality is not a good reason to ignore the role language 
plays in mathematics. The intuitionist can be loyal to the 
distinction Brouwer makes between mathematics and 
mathematical language and still underscore the role language plays 
in mathematics.  
Heyting (1956) made the first attempt to devise a formal 
semantics for intuitionistic logic. He was fully aware of the fact 
that the objective truth-conditional semantics of classical logic 
fails to capture the metaphysical anti-realism of intuitionism. So 
he proposed a replacement delineated in terms of proof-
conditions, rather than truth-conditions. Despite his attempt, he 
shared the animosity Brouwer harbored towards the role of 
language and logic in mathematics. 
Later, a major systematic linguistic turn in intuitionism 
was made by Michael Dummett. Dummett (1977, 1978) managed 
to accomplish an important task, he developed a semantical 
theory not only for mathematical language, but also for the rest of 
language. A semantical theory consistent with intuitionism. In his 
own words ‘What I have done here is to transfer to ordinary 
propositions what the intuitionists say about mathematical 
propositions’ (Dummett, 2001, p. 247). Dummett’s semantical 
theory stems from Wittgenstein’s later views; according to which 
the use of a proposition, rather than its truth-conditions, 
determines its meaning. Dummett invites us to compare truth 
with the formal rules of winning and losing in a board-game. 
There are formal rules for what is called ‘win’ and ‘lose’, rules that 
are defined in terms of the final positions of the participants in 
the game. These rules may be able to tell apart the winner from 
the looser, but they ignore an important aspect; namely, ‘it is part 
of the concept of winning a game that a player plays to win’ 
(Dummett, 2001, p. 230). Likewise, we need to take into account 
that ‘it is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true 
propositions’ (Dummett, 2001, p. 230). Dummett strongly 
believed truth-conditional semantics failed to fulfill this aspect. 
Dummett represents the anti-realist neo-verificationist movement 
which has been a critique of metaphysical realism within the 
analytic movement.  
It seems that underneath all the technicalities of Kripke 
semantics lies a great deal of metaphysical antirealism that Beall 
and Restall have not taken into account. Now, how does all this 
metaphysical jargon pertain to logic? The connection lies within 
the antirealism held by the intuitionist. To quote Brouwer himself, 
The long belief in the universal validity of the 
principle of the excluded third in mathematics is 
considered by intuitionism as a phenomenon of 
history of civilization of the same kind as the old-
time belief in the rationality of  or in the rotation 
of the firmament on an axis passing through the 
earth. And Intuitionism tries to explain the long 
persistence of this dogma by two facts: firstly, the 
obvious non-contradictority of the principle for 
an arbitrary single assertion; secondly the practical 
validity of the whole of classical logic for an 
extensive group of simple everyday phenomena. 
The latter fact apparently made such a strong 
impression that the play of thought that classical 
logic originally was, became a deep-rooted habit 
of thought which was considered not only as 
useful but even as aprioristic (Brouwer, 1948, p. 
94). 
Dummett, too, writes with the same spirit ‘classical 
mathematics employs forms of reasoning which are not valid on 
any legitimate way of constructing mathematical statements’ 
(Dummett, 1978, p. 215). 
It’s fairly clear that intuitionists were vehemently against 
classical forms of reasoning. Their primary target, as Brouwer 
points out, is the law of excluded middle (LEM). For intuitionists, 
(LEM) rests upon metaphysical realism about mathematical 
objects and the mind-independent truth-value of mathematical 
sentences. The rejection of one horn does not imply the 
acceptance of the other. There is no independent mathematical 
realm out there in virtue of which this is guaranteed. (LEM) is 
true if and only if one of the horns can be proven; which in 
intuitionistic terminology equates with mental construction. 
Dummett simply generalizes this phenomenon and expands it 
include to non-mathematical domains. 
Given all the metaphysical underpinnings of intuitionism, 
does it sound reasonable to simply assume both complete and 
paracomplete cases are equally justified? For the intuitionist, 
paracompleteness is rooted in his anti-realist metaphysics which 
he deems to be superior to realism. Yet, as we saw in the previous 
section, Beall and Restall portray this significant gap as a mere 
choice between two innocent options. 
Let’s take this even further by discussing another logic. 
The cases of classical logic, i.e. Tarskian models, are complete and 
consistent. The domain of objects is also non-empty. Free logic 
was devised by Lambert (1960) to get rid of the ontological 
assumptions of classical logic. Lambert sees his project as an 
extension of the eradication of existential assumptions that 
classical logic applied to Aristotelian logic. In Aristotelian logic, 
predicates should have non-empty extensions. Classical logic 
eradicated this assumption by including empty predicates. 
Lambert takes it one step further and eradicates the existential 
assumption of singular terms and the non-emptiness of domains 
from classical logic. 
Free logic does meet the two criteria Beall and Restall put 
forward for cases. Their cases are similar to Tarskian models, except 
for the fact that they include empty domains, and they are very 
good at assigning truth-values to their sentences. The truth-
assignment may change in different semantics, but one principle 
stays the same: it is possible for an empty domain to exist. 
Are cases that include empty domains superior to those 
that don’t? Proponents of Free logics would say yes. The ability 
of models that include empty domain far outweighs that of its 
opponents. It is superior in that it removes unnecessary, and even 
problematic, existential assumptions. It’s seen as an advancement 
over classical logic as much as classical logic is an advancement 
over Aristotelian logic. 
The historical account of the conflict between classical 
logic and the two rivals mentioned above suggests that the 
conflict between logics really lies at the level of cases; which Beall 
and Restall seem to be relatively liberal about. The intuitionist 
maintains that mental constructions are the only legitimate 
instances of case. And they are very adamant in their rejection of 
classical cases which assume realism about mathematical objects. 
Similarly, the proponents of Free logic maintain that the only 
legitimate cases are those that include empty domains. Cases that 
restrict their domains to non-empty ones are illegitimate in their 
opinion. They see the eradication of the ontological assumptions 
of classical logic as an advancement, and the cases they consider 
legitimate are superior to classical cases. 
4. Concluding remarks 
As we saw earlier, Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism rests upon 
the notion of case. In light of their account, we should seek the 
real reason behind the conflict between rival logics in their choice 
of cases. As demonstrated in the previous section, historically 
speaking, there is a metaphysical dimension to the notion of case. 
For the intuitionist, the choice of case is based upon their 
metaphysical antirealism. For the proponents of Free logic, it is 
based upon the inclusion of empty domains and eradication of 
the existential assumptions of classical logic. Therefore, the real 
conflict between rival logics is a metaphysical conflict.  
A genuine form of logical pluralism would convince the 
intuitionist to stay fully loyal to his metaphysical anti-realism, yet 
be able to incorporate classical reasoning at the same time; to be 
both fully intuitionistic and fully classical. This requires the full 
acceptance of both classical cases and intuitionistic cases at the 
same time. The same goes for Free logics. To regard both 
classical and Free logics as equally legitimate, one needs to regard 
both empty and non-empty cases as equally legitimate. Beall and 
Restall fail to offer any argument for the equal legitimacy of cases 
and thus fail to argue for a genuine form of logical pluralism. 
At this point, we hope to have shown that in order for 
Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism to succeed there needs to be 
an argument for the equal legitimacy of cases. And that at least in 
the case of intuitionistic and Free logics this argument falls within 
the domain of metaphysics9; which in and of itself is worth noting 
to the logician who prefers to bury his head in the sand of 
mathematical technicalities and ignore the fact that some of these 
conflicts originated from a metaphysical dispute. 
The proponents of both of the abovementioned parties 
seem to have good reasons not to consider logical pluralism at all 
since it may have seemingly bizarre implications. For the 
intuitionist, metaphysical realism needs to be equally legitimate to 
metaphysical antirealism. For the Free logician, the existential 
assumption of the existence of non-empty domains should be 
rendered moot. These assertions sound highly implausible to the 
extent that one would just rather stay in his comfort zone and 
adopt some form of logical monism. 
So, for Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism to succeed 
there needs to be an argument in favor of some form of non-
monism in ontology10. This forces the logical pluralist into the 
domain of metaontology. Mathematical objects either exist or 
they don’t. The existential assumptions of classical logic are either 
                                                     
9 For another example of how one’s metaphysics can play a role in his choice 
of logic see Priest (2014). 
10 Prominent proponent of this view include Chalmers (2009), Hirsch (2002), 
and Yablo (1998). 
true or they are not. On the level of ontology, questions of 
existence are dealt with; like the existence of mathematical objects 
and empty domain. On the level of metaontology, it is discussed 
that whether there are objective answers to these kinds of 
questions.  
According to what has been discussed so far, a negative 
answer to the metaontological question of the existence of one 
single objective answer to ontological questions, would greatly 
benefit Beall and Restall’s account of logical pluralism. 
References 
Beall, J. C. (2018, April 12). Logical Pluralism and the One True 
Logic. Incheon, South Korea: The 2nd Veritas Philosophy 
Conference: Yonsei International Campus. 
Beall, J. C., & Restall, G. (2000). Logical Pluralism. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 78 (4): 475-493. 
Beall, J. C., & Restall, G. (2001). Defending Logical Pluralism. 
Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches Proceedings of the 1999 
Conference of the Society of Exact Philosophy (pp. 1-22). 
Stanmore: Hermes. 
Beall, J. C., & Restall, G. (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Brouwer, L. E. (1948). Consciousness, Philosophy and 
Mathematics. In P. Benacerraf, & H. Putnam, Philosophy of 
Mathematics: Selected Readings (pp. 90-96). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Burgess, J. P. (2009). Philosophical Logic. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Caret, C. (2017). The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been 
Greatly Exaggerated. Erkenntnis , 82 (4): 739-760. 
Carnap, R. (1937). The Logical Syntax of Language. London: K. Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co. 
Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie , 4 (11): 20-40. 
Chalmers, D. J. (2009). Ontological Anti-Realism. In D. J. 
Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman, Metametaphysics: 
New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 77-129). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cook, R. T. (2010). Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of 
Logical Pluralism. Philosophy Compass , 5 (6): 492-504. 
Dummett, M. (1977). Elements of intuitionism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dummett, M. (1978). The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic 
Logic. In M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas (pp. 215-
247). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Dummett, M. (2001). Truth. In M. P. Lynch, The Nature of Truth: 
Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 229-249). 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Heyting, A. (1956). Intuitionism. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing. 
Hirsch, E. (2002). Quantifier Variance and Realism. Noûs, 36 (s1): 
51-73. 
Keefe, R. (2014). What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be. Synthese, 191 
(7): 1375-1390. 
Kripke, S. (1965). Semantical analysis of intuitionistic logic. In J. 
Crossley, & M. A. Dummett, Formal Systems and Recursive 
Functions: Proceedings of the Eighth Logic Colloquium (pp. 92-
130). Oxford: North Holland. 
Lambert, K. (1960). The Definition of E! in Free Logic. Abstracts: 
The International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy 
of Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
McKeon, M. W. (2010). The Concept of Logical Consequence. New 
York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc. 
Priest, G. (2001). Logic: One or Many? In J. Woods, & B. Brown, 
Logical consequences: Rival Approaches (pp. 23-38). Oxford: 
Hermes Scientific Publishers. 
Priest, G. (2006). Doubt Truth to Be A Liar. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Priest, G. (2014). Logical Pluralism: Another Application for 
Chunk and Permeate. Erkenntnis, 79 (2): 331–338. 
Quine, W. V. (1970). Philosophy of Logic. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, INC. 
Read, S. (2006). Monism: The One True Logic. In D. Devidi, & 
T. kenyon, A Logical Approach to Philosophy (pp. 193-209). 
Berlin: Springer. 
Restall, G. (2002). Carnap's Tolerance, Meaning, and Logical 
Pluralism. Journal of Philosophy , 99 (8): 426-443. 
Restall, G. (2014). Pluralism and Proofs. Erkenntnis, 79 (2): 279–
291. 
Schlimm, D. (2005). Against Against Intuitionism. Synthese, 147 
(1): 171-188. 
Tarski, A. (1983). On the Concept of Logical Consequence. In A. 
Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing. 
Yablo, S. (1998). Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake? The 
Aristotleian Society Supplementary Volume, 72 (1): 229-262. 
  
